THE New Republic

Washington Slams the Academic Door against Oppenheimer

PAGE 7

A State of Insecurity

The Director of the University of Chicago's Institute for the Study of US Foreign Policy Examines the State Department Loyalty Program

BY HANS J. MORGENTHAU

Statesmen in British Politics

Bagehot's Aristocratic View . . . . . *J. G. Pearson*

Decline of Labour Leadership . . . . . *Michael Straight*

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Washington Wire .... T.R.B.

Mark the date and the speaker; they are important! On April 4, 1955, Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an official, prepared text, told the Senate Appropriations Committee: "We have reached a state where atomic weapons are now conventional and their use is being fully integrated in our strategy and tactics." End sentence, end quotation, end Era.

Eisenhower told subordinates not to speculate about the chances of war over Quemoy and Matsu, and his lieutenants have dutifully obeyed—even to a point where there is an almost complete blackout of news at the Pentagon which is driving reporters crazy. Meanwhile Communist Reds methodically continue moving shore troops into position for attack, repeat their determination to take the islands and ultimately Formosa, and warn Britain to keep hands-off. Is the war danger any less this week than last because of the official silence? Not that we can find out. Does the public know what we are going to do? Not that we know. The policy of planned confusion continues and, as far as we are able to learn, the President is as undecided about what he will do as before.

Where does America stand morally if atomic war comes? Britain and Canada have in effect already spoken: they will not support us. Nationalist China wants war; so, it begins to seem, does Red China. So, very likely, does Red Russia because war would tie down the US and split the great coalition of the West while Russia waxes strong.

Who is morally responsible? Well, the Red Chinese are intoxicated with power and in no mood to be reasonable. They cannot avoid part of any blame. But suppose the roles were reversed. Suppose, for example, that Red China had come over and occupied Staten Island and an atomic war had ensued; who would be responsible? Quemoy and Matsu are ferryboat islands off the mainland; each bottles up a big Chinese port. The islands were not militarily important until Ike, in February, 1953, "unleashed" Chiang Kai-shek and told the US mission on Formosa to supply them with goods and guns. So again . . . who would be morally responsible for war in China?

McCarthy sat there, swart and sinister. In the well of the committee chamber sat Foreign Operations Administrator Harold Stassen, big and bald. TV lights beat down, four cameramen crouched five feet away at table-end, flash cameras like four auto headlights focused and ready. McCarthy was raging. Stassen smiled. He repeated quietly that McCarthy's henchmen last year called Stassen's subordinates into secret hearings, made transcripts, refused to let the FOA subordinates see the transcripts and then doctored them. McCarthy shot denials; Stassen calmly insisted. McCarthy spat and swelled, looking more heavily repulsive than before his power cracked. He demanded a grand jury—an indictment—a trial for "perjury under oath." The new chairman, Sen. John McClellan (D, Ark.), cold and sinister in his own way, paid little heed.

A big pile driver, putting in foundations for a new office building, earthquaked outside. And somehow we have the strangest impression that this was all a parody, that this amazing imitation of McCarthy was an act, a monstrous burlesque; that no man could really behave like this, and that nobody like this could have scared America into hysterics for three years. All our sympathy was with Stassen in the McCarthy exchange. But there were odd goings-on in Stassen's own FOA in regard to a Pakistan grain-elevator construction contract which the McClellan Committee is investigating. Watching McClellan's grim, hard face, we imagine he will get to the bottom of it, too. McCarthy's tortured torment of blocked ambition is an irrelevancy.

We sat beside Edward Corsi at a quiet press dinner a fortnight ago. It was our first meeting. He is a big, outspoken, left-of-center, LaGuardia-type Republican who came to America at the age of 12, was Hoover's Commissioner of Immigration and has run on the GOP ticket in New York for mayor and US Senator. He was quite frank about his job. Ike in the 1952 campaign promised foreign-language audiences to revise the "un-American" Walter-McCarran Immigration Act but hasn't been able to do so; he got through the three-year "Refugee Relief Act" which is a flop. Corsi was rushed down to make it work, before it expires during the 1956 election. Democratic demagogue Rep. Francis E. Walter (Pa.) immediately attacked Corsi as a "Red." Corsi told us sadly he was "rather amazed" nobody in the Administration had risen to defend him. "If I hadn't been a prominent Republican this [attack] might have snuffed me out completely," he told us. Ten days later Dulles knifed him.

Has Dulles ever supported a subordinate under fire? We don't recall it. There is an odd moral fogginess over the whole of Washington in this Administration. Ike did not resist McCarthy—so Dulles let Cohn and Schine censor US Information libraries abroad and gag the Voice of America. Like master, like man.

Dulles has one private rule, to keep out of Congressional cross-fires. He named Scott McLeod to purge the State Department, fired veteran John Paton Davies Jr.—cleared by eight previous security investigations—let his court jester, Carl McCardle, "leak" the Yalta papers with marginal chitchat to please the GOP right-wing, and he has done all this, and other jobs, with an air of unctuous piety. Corsi, it suddenly developed, had been appointed on only a "90-day" basis. No question of security, of course; he was just dropped. Rep. Emanuel Celler (D, N.Y.) exclaimed in disgust that he could make a better backbone than Dulles' "out of a banana." Celler misses the point: Dulles feels he has plenty of courage but that the task of defending America's moral position abroad is too important to risk it in fighting for a subordinate at home!

. . . Readers do not need to be told the inevitable comment from the White House. From first to last Eisenhower had not been told about the Corsi episode, only knew what he read in the papers. (PS: Ike doesn't read many papers.)

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Stevenson: Talking Sense on Asian Peace

APRIL 15 was the day set by Admiral Robert Carney for the Chinese Communist invasion of the coastal islands. April 16, if Admiral Carney, Admiral Arthur Radford, Sen. William Knowland and Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson had their way, would be the first day of war between the US and the largest nation on earth.

Three days before the 15th, Adlai Stevenson analyzed in a radio speech the madness of the Republican policy of staking "the prestige and honor of the United States, not to mention the peace of the world . . . on some little islands within the shadow of the China coast in which we have no claim or interest." Stevenson's speech came late in the day and he spoke as a private citizen. And yet coming at a time when public opinion was swinging against intervention, the speech may have contributed to the maintenance of peace.

For during weeks of irresolution, President Eisenhower has given every indication of an inability to determine and carry out the course of action that is right. Instead, as in the case of the controversy over Mr. Nixon's finances in 1952, he has apparently postponed his decision, waiting for the public to make up his mind and the nation's course in the rough and tumble of free and often uninformed debate.

Stevenson in his precise manner has rescued the debate at last from the emotional orgy in which most of the Congress participated. He has faced the issue of war over the coastal islands and he has swung a substantial segment of public opinion toward peace.

Conscious always of the national peril, Stevenson has refrained from making political capital out of the blunders of Eisenhower and Dulles. But he has rightly pointed toward the inner politics of the Republican Party as the root of our troubles in the far Pacific. He has made the best kind of political contribution by enunciating the truth.

Stevenson attacks the Republican doctrine that "face" in Asia is equated with militarism and the power to dominate. He discards in passing the Administration's claim that we can unload atomic bombs on China and yet avoid the consequences of a general war. He asks us "to present once more the true face of America—warm and modest and friendly." Our first priority, he holds, is to restore allied unity.

Once again Stevenson is talking sense to Americans. For the British Commonwealth nations will gladly exchange a guarantee of Formosan independence for an evacuation of the islands. If Dulles and Eisenhower will stop gambling, this major gain is now within our grasp.

Head on a Platter

ON THE DAY after he was fired by Secretary Dulles, Edward Corsi met reporters in Washington. "I came down solely relying on the integrity and honesty of Mr. Dulles," he said. He never made a greater mistake.

In campaign speeches before substantial minority groups, President Eisenhower committed his government to vigorous administration of the 1953 Refugee Relief Act. It permits the entry of 209,000 non-quota immigrants, mainly victims of Communist persecution in Eastern Europe, into the United States within a three-year period. The program is due to end on December 30, 1956. But, as of March 18, 1955, the United States had admitted, in all, 764 "refugees, escapees and expellees"; 543 orphans; 12,374 Italian relatives of US citizens; 1,917 Greek relatives, and 250 Dutch relatives. By any standards the record was a miserable failure.

To bring new life to the program, Mr. Dulles called in his "good friend" Edward Corsi, who had campaigned for him in 1948 as a regular Republican and whose opposition to the restrictive and discriminatory features written into the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act were well known.

Among the State Department officials vitally interested in Mr. Corsi's Washington career was Mr. Scott McLeod. In his capacity as administrator of the refugee program, Mr. McLeod held a powerful post which Mr. Corsi and other advocates of a liberalized immigration program seemed likely to abolish in favor of one subject to appointment by the President and confirmation by the Senate. In his capacity as Chief of the State Department's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Mr. McLeod was responsible for the security clearance that Mr. Corsi required in his job.

On January 10, Mr. Corsi laughingly remarked in a newspaper interview that he was "left of center." Later Corsi recalled: "Carl McCardle (Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs)



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blew up. McLeod blew up. Walter's attacks followed."

It was McLeod who fed to Representative Walter the information that Corsi had once belonged to two groups branded by the Attorney General as Communist fronts: the Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born and The National Lawyer's Guild. Walter, already irritated by Corsi's public charge that the McCarran-Walter Act was full of "venom," needed no further encouragement.

"Herb Brownell, Secretary Dulles," said Corsi after his dismissal, "I've known them in the party all my years as a Republican. But after Walter made his unfounded charges, nobody spoke out. Nobody was around. I've never felt so much a stranger."

So Corsi was fired. His dismissal he explained by his refusal to "act as window dressing" for the Refugee Relief Act. "I took my job seriously," he said, "but some people in the Department just wanted window dressing. They wanted to go on doing business as usual."

In notifying Corsi of his dismissal, his State Department superiors insisted that "security" was not involved. Their statement was at best misleading. Corsi certainly was not found to be a "security risk" by McLeod as were so many others whose presence in the State Department was held to be undesirable. No charges were brought against Corsi by the Executive. But neither was he given a security clearance. McLeod simply failed to act. The security regulations provide that no temporary appointment in a sensitive post can continue beyond 90 days without a clearance. And so McLeod drove Corsi out of the State Department by the well-worn method of delay.

The decision concerning Mr. Dulles' "good friend," however, was Mr. Dulles' alone. For under the terms of Executive Order 10450 McLeod can recommend action to Mr. Dulles, but he cannot himself hire or fire State Department personnel. It was for Dulles to evaluate the information gathered on Corsi and to reach his own decision. He did just that. In his talk with his good friend, he held Representative Walter to blame and explained that in dealings with Congress (unlike in Russia) appeasement was both necessary and worthwhile. However, he added, in a veiled illusion, that a too-close review of Corsi's record might prove embarrassing. His good friend was apparently a security risk after all, which, under the terms of Executive Order 10450 might make Mr. Dulles one too.

Chicago's New Boss

THE CHICAGO Democratic Organization retained its title to City Hall in the April 5 mayoralty election without a shot being fired. It then settled down to another item on its agenda—the nomination of Adlai E. Stevenson for President at the Democratic National Convention next year.

Just three days after Richard J. Daley, Cook County Democratic chairman, was elected mayor, he met with Stevenson in Chicago to discuss a number of party projects. While the party fellahin were not let in on the text of these discussions, it was generally assumed that the two primarily were concerned with repairs to the organization's internal structures, which had been weakened during the primary by important defections.

Daley defeated his Republican opponent, Robert E. Merriam, by a majority of 126,667 votes—a comfortable margin, but no landslide in a total vote of 1,342,999. Merriam, 36-year-old reform alderman and maverick Democrat, spearheaded a desperate GOP effort to seize City Hall and break the legs of the old Kelly-Nash machine.

The Republican campaign began as an all-out crusade to throw the rascals out, banging away at the theme that the Democratic Organization sponsored a conspiracy of criminals and politicians which accounted for Chicago's bloodshed and wickedness. Merriam's crusade seemed to attract some independents, but it lost him the support of the hoodlum politicians in the Republican Party who played dead on election day. It never developed the protest vote on which the Republican strategists at the state capital had counted.

The Democrats contented themselves with defending the status quo and promised more of it. Daley pictured himself as a simple family man going to church on Sunday mornings with his seven children. It was evident that Daley and his robust family had a good deal more voter appeal than Merriam's philippics about the big, bad old town.

It was evident, too, that the Organization's shock troops were in the line on election day. The Organization mustered an average of 125 votes a precinct, a total of 519,625 votes. This was the base on which Daley's victory was built, although it could not have elected him without labor and independent support.

As mayor and party leader, Daley, next to National Committeeman Jacob M. Arvey, is now the most powerful supporter of Adlai Stevenson in the Democratic Party.

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Volume 132, Number 16, Issue 2108

Washington Wire by T. R. B. 2
Behind the Headlines 3
The State of Insecurity 8
by Hans J. Morgenthau
Will We Live on Air? 15
by Bruce Bliven
Thad Snow, the Farmer 16
by Webster Schott
Books and Comment 18
Television 21
Correspondence 22

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Decline of Labour Leadership

"FOR THE first time in my life," said a lifelong liberal in England, "I'm going to vote Conservative." Her choice in the coming general election reflects the contrast between a Conservative leadership that is vigorous and enlightened and a Labour Party that has little to offer at present but conflicts and clichés.

In the years of peace since 1919 the Conservative Party stood for imperial exploitation abroad and class privilege at home. The Labour Party offered a social status to all men around which alone economic and political progress could be organized. It formed a government in 1945 because the need was felt for a reordering of society to fulfill sacrifices of the Second World War. And in the postwar years no other party could have carried the nation along with the harsh but necessary adjustments that were demanded of Britain and achieved under great men like Ernest Bevin and Stafford Cripps.

The success of the Labour Government unravelled the threads that bound the Labour Party together. It was built, over 55 years, on the solidarity and class consciousness of workers who resented social discrimination. When their social status was established they ceased to hate the Tories. And with prosperity they lost interest in the Socialist dream. With that change the Labour Party became a minority again. As Mark Arnold-Foster writes: "A party that represents the underdogs and no one else can no longer hope for a majority; there are not enough underdogs."

Real wages have risen even faster under the Conservative Government. The working class is fractionalized by satisfaction. Resentment and bitterness are limited substantially to the new recruits of the lower-middle-class who feel that they are denied the further rise in the social scale commensurate with their increased earnings. This group, collectively lacking in tradition and personally insecure, provides the supporters of the mass movements of extreme Left and Right. It is the base on which Aneurin Bevan is endeavoring to anchor the Labour Party, even though he and his supporters know it is a base not of rock but of shifting sand.

A geographical breakdown of Bevanism shows that it springs not from the traditional strongholds of working-class militancy but from the new concentrations of middle-class discontent. To this group Bevanism appeals, less as a positive statement of the Socialist future than as a destructive attack upon the status quo. As such it is gaining in strength. Old party workers see in Bevanism the rekindling of the old glories. Young party recruits find in it the single faith that requires little thought. Rank and filers identify it with their unhappiness over the growing centralization and bureaucratization of the trade unions and the Labour Party. And Communist Party members who find Bevanism a convenient vehicle have learned that infiltration of the Labour Party branches is the easiest of tasks. In the confusion caused by the redistricting of constituencies these new-found allies are nominating many candidates. In turn the principled moderates of the party, such as Hugh Gaitskell, are being driven rightwards by the vacuum on the right, even though they know that it is from the center that the top leadership of the party must come.

It was the rise of Bevanism, even while its leader sank, that prompted the ill-considered, ill-managed and ill-fated move to expel Bevan from the Labour Party. The right-wing as a result is weaker, not stronger, than before. A year ago Bevan confided to friends that the "Bevanites" were an albatross around his neck. Now it is the Bevanites who are held back by the personal weaknesses of their leader.

Responsibility may be a cure for all ills. But in opposition the Labour Party is forfeiting its claims to become the government of Britain. The reasons are wholesome at heart. There is nothing the Labour Party can offer that is better than the full employment that continued under Tory management. There is no better course in foreign policy than the policy of firmness and conciliation that Eden has made his own. On matters of policy and party responsibility the Labour Party is not offering answers or even facing problems. The center lacks vitality and, still worse, courage, and while Bevan remains half in, half out of the party, neither Bevanites nor anti-Bevanites will undertake the dedicated tasks of canvassing that mean success at the polls.

In contrast, the Conservative Party is gaining in strength and support. The Conservative leadership has accepted the new environment created by the Labour Government. It is more flexible in organization and probably more receptive to new ideas. New ability is flowing into the lower ranks of the party. At the top, the departure of Sir Winston is not an electoral loss. As a leader, in years of crisis, Churchill was incomparable. But he was not the most representative of Englishmen. Pacifism acceded to the place of belligerency in the British heart in Churchill's lifetime, and dislike of domination, the place of his adventuresome lust to rule. Wherever he went crowds expressed their love and gratitude. But for all his promises of meetings at the summit the old leader never rid himself of his earlier reputation as a man of war. And so the crowds that cheered him were doubtful about voting for him.

Eden is a better standard bearer than Churchill for the Conservatives. He stands for a courteous independence of the US and a patient and painstaking faith in diplomacy in dealing with the Communist world. So he expresses the present mood of Britain as perfectly as President Eisenhower represents the desire of Americans to set aside troubling thoughts while they settle in suburbia and complete the payments on their two-toned cars.

Eden is only 58. And if he falters, then beyond him the succession is clear in Mr. Butler, as popular in the country as the new Prime Minister and far more popular in the Conservative Party. Beyond Butler in turn a third rank of young leaders is pressing forward with greater force than is shown by dispirited Labourites of the same age. Reginald Maulding, Minister of Supply in the new government, at 38 is one of a half-dozen spoken of as future Prime Ministers and yet liked on all sides.

A war over Matsu and Quemoy, of course, could transform the election prospects. The Labour Party candidates would voice the national spirit in denouncing it; the Conservatives would like to denounce it but would be inhibited by the responsibilities of office and their traditional endorsement of alliances with the US. Short of war a major Conservative victory is in the making.

MICHAEL STRAIGHT

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Guarding the "Best Interests" of the University

ALTHOUGH in past years Harold Laski, Harry Elmer Barnes and Malcolm Cowley were scorned by University of Washington officials as "Marxist, anti-revisionist, and leftist," they nevertheless spoke on campus platforms. Others like Kenneth Burke were turned back at the University gates for miscellaneous scholastic and political deviations. But with its recent refusal to allow a lecture on campus by Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the University has brought upon itself some chilling blasts from the academic community and virtually sealed itself off from the outside world of science and scholarship.

Last winter the University physics department asked Oppenheimer to give a series of lectures this spring in "three areas of physics." Oppenheimer tentatively accepted. Henry P. Schmitz, University president, then announced that "after long and careful study of Oppenheimer's governmental relationships" he was cancelling the invitation. "Bringing Dr. Oppenheimer here at this time," he said, "would not be in the best interests of the University." (Schmitz said later that the "long and careful study" had been the reading of the transcripts of the hearing before the Atomic Energy Commission's Personnel Security Board. He read as far as the point at which Oppenheimer "admitted he lied," and no further.)

The students were the first to react. "The decision," one wrote in the university daily, "smacks of bigotry, weakness, and compromise." Another thanked Schmitz for "protecting its interests" and said, "this will result in our becoming not only the Silent but also the Deaf Mute Generation." The faculty followed. "A very deep resentment and feeling of shame among many faculty members" was reported by a botany professor. "The bell is tolling not only for the Physics Department but for all of us," said a history professor.

Four hundred students attended a meeting at which four faculty members condemned Schmitz's action. Forty of the students were delegated to "march on" the State Capitol at Olympia, where Governor Arthur B. Langlie granted three of them an interview. The *Seattle Times* reported that Langlie told the students that the Oppenheimer decision was up to Dr. Schmitz and that he, as Governor, did not indicate approval or disapproval. But the student delegation reported the interview somewhat differently. "I don't know," Langlie told the students, "how many mothers of boys whose sons had fought the Communists in Korea have told me that their boys had lost their God-fearing values at the University of Washington." Langlie said that student minds had been corrupted



Leonard Maxwell

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer

at the University ever since Hugh DeLacy (ex-Congressman and Langlie's perennial symbol for left-wing Democracy) had taught English there. "Oppenheimer," he said, "has been loose with the nation's security. And with the background of the University, you want to bring Oppenheimer here!"

Langlie (recently persuaded by President Eisenhower to run against incumbent Democrat Warren G. Magnuson for the Senate in 1956) concluded the interview by telling the students they "were being divisive when they should be uniting against Communism."

On campus, the Organizations Assembly, representing half the student body, unanimously asked Schmitz to reconsider. So did the Board of Control, the student-faculty "governing body." But students don't appoint University presidents. Schmitz refused. Then the University Board of Regents, after scanning a Petition of Grievances signed by 1,100 students, voted without debate to support the ban.

The Regents' decision did not end the affair. Dr. Victor A. Weiskopf, professor of Physics at M.I.T., has refused an invitation to lecture. "As long as the Oppenheimer ban stands," he said, "no self-respecting physicist could go to the University of Washington." Dr. Perry Miller, literary historian at Harvard, has refused to lecture because of the school's "egregious" insult to Oppenheimer. Dr. Alex Inkeles, Harvard sociologist, also declined a lecture invitation.

This academic cold-shoulder turned into a total freeze when seven Eastern scientists decided not to attend a scientific conference ("Symposium on the Molecular Basis of Enzyme Action"), scheduled for the University's new $12 million Medical School in April. The conference, to which 300 scientists had been invited, was cancelled.

Dr. Ralph Hinstead, director of the American Association of University Professors, describes the situation at the University as "very bad." The National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Foundation may soon take action. The American Association for the Advancement of Science is said to be considering a censure of the university.

Finally, 200 University of Washington faculty members, in an official, secret poll, voted by a three-to-one margin to "disapprove" the action by Schmitz. The following day, members of the University Graduate School students' general council voted, 20-5, to "deplore" Schmitz' action.

In the face of academic isolation, the President stands firm. He has assured the boycotting scientists that they misunderstood his decision, that no question of academic freedom is involved. The Board of Regents, while conceding the seriousness of the boycott, has reaffirmed its support of Schmitz. The controversy has attracted the editorial interest of Fulton Lewis Jr. He wrote:

> The continued refusal of the scientific world to accept the judgment against Dr. Oppenheimer as a security risk has reached a point of mulish obduracy. The boycott campaign is being waged with the wholehearted connivance and concurrence of left-wing pundits.

Schmitz has been supported by the presidents of Seattle University, Pacific Lutheran College (Tacoma), and Seattle Pacific College, by the University of

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Washington Alumni Association, and by the Seattle Junior Chamber of Commerce.

The only persons who appear to want Oppenheimer as a lecturer here are students, scholars, teachers and scientists.

As for Oppenheimer, his comment was brief: "It seems to me that the University has embarrassed itself."

Seattle JAY G. SYKES

William Allen White's Kind of Republican

KANSAS New Dealers are accustomed to dwell in a condition of perpetual political frustration. They would not have been surprised, therefore, if the Sunflower State this year became the 19th state to adopt so-called "right-to-work" legislation. But in spite of powerful pressure and substantial majorities for the law in the legislature, it did not enter the statute books, thanks to the veto of Republican Governor Fred Hall.

When the 1955 legislature convened, a right-to-work bill was introduced for the third successive time. House Bill 30 would have wiped out the union shop and other forms of compulsory union membership; it provided fines and imprisonment to those denying employment to anyone who did not choose to join a union.

Business corporations, the Kansas Chamber of Commerce, the State Farm Bureau, and a lobbying group called "Kansas Right-to-Work, Incorporated" expended large sums on dinners, films, mass meetings, newspaper ads, radio and TV in the hope of influencing the legislature, the Governor and the public to support of the bill. Following the bill's passage by the lower house by a 66-45 vote, the *Topeka Journal* said: "Right to work forces won the biggest, most colorful and bruising battle of the 1955 legislative session."

A veto would obviously place the Governor in the unusual position (for Kansas) of disagreeing with organized business, the farm lobby, the legislature, and most Kansas voters. Nevertheless he vetoed House Bill 30.

This unexpected act of Fred Hall would have come as even more of a shock if the background of his nomination and election as Governor were not recalled. For almost two decades, the state house in Topeka has been controlled by a Republican machine that is neither "progressive" nor "moderate." Long before last spring's gubernatorial primary, the machine was out to prevent Hall's becoming Governor. In his two terms as Lieutenant Governor, Hall had shown too independent and critical a spirit.

For reasons that may have varied from voter dissatisfaction with the machine to a popular desire for a more progressive state government, the voters gave Hall a convincing majority. Between the primary and the November election, persistent rumors flew around the state that certain party leaders preferred to see George Docking, Lawrence banker and the Democratic candidate, elected rather than the unmanageable Hall. But Hall was elected. (A study of the voting did suggest, however, that many Republicans had either failed to vote or had voted for Docking.)

On January 10, Governor Hall delivered an inaugural address which was a departure from the generalities of former inaugural speeches. He referred to his estrangement with the party machine by declaring that "never before in our state has a governor owed so little to so few and so much to so many"; he said he was "under obligation to no one" but the people of Kansas. He pinned on himself the Eisenhower label, "progressive moderate." He said that states' rights are "not an excuse for inaction," and he called for the enactment of forward-looking laws on education, taxation, social welfare, labor and anti-discrimination.

But it was in his eight-page veto of the "right-to-work" bill that Governor Hall gave the people of Kansas his greatest demonstration of moral force. He pointed out that unions were the culmination of workers' efforts to secure protection against powerful employers; that just as the Constitution protected citizens' political rights, unions looked after the workers' economic position; that the label "right-to-work" was a misnomer because the bill would not insure any worker a job where there was no job. Such a misleading label, he wrote, was designed to deceive the public into thinking that the bill under consideration advanced their rights, but in effect, it originated with business elements who were more interested in profits than in workers' welfare.

Lobbyists for the bill, Hall said, had subjected the legislature and the Governor to a greater campaign of propaganda than they had ever before endured. He particularly deplored the efforts made to turn farmers against labor by allegations that the realization of union demands "would lead to a socialistic government." Such a claim, he said tersely, was "not a sound argument" but was designed to obscure the real issue under debate and to arouse public fears.

President Louis Weiss of "Kansas Right-to-Work" issued a press release charging the Governor with turning "against the workers and farmers of Kansas" and going over to the "powerful union bosses whose union treasuries he thinks he needs to support his fanatical climb to greater political power." Weiss hoped "an infuriated citizenry will repudiate this traitorous veto."

The House by a 78-44 vote fell six votes short of the required two-thirds majority to override the Governor's veto. Seventy-two Republicans and six Democrats voted to override while 28 Democrats and 16 Republicans supported the Governor. With but a few days left before adjournment, it appeared possible that the Legislature, bitter over its defeat and numbering many anti-Hall members, might reject several of the Governor's bills still awaiting passage. The *Topeka Journal* wrote on March 29 that "an enraged House of Representatives has practically put Governor Hall's legislative program on the skids and shoved it into oblivion. Chances to save the Governor's No. 1 proposal—high-school aid—seemingly went down the drain late Monday night. . . ." The *Journal's* anticipation, however, was premature, for Democrats joined Hall forces to pass the high-school aid measure, a labor relations law and a small loan bill.

When an exhausted legislature adjourned on April 3 at 3 a.m., two significant results were apparent: a Republican executive, as in national politics, has been able to get most of his program passed only with Democratic support; and in Hall, Kansas has a new phenomenon — a Republican Governor with liberal tendencies and the courage to fight for them.

Topeka MARC KARSON

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A State of Insecurity

by Hans J. Morgenthau

THE propositions which are being set forth in this article are completely and emphatically at odds with the assumptions which underlie the security system, as applied to the Department of State. The author does not only take exception to the way in which the security regulations have been applied to certain prominent men —an attitude shared by many; he also questions the very conception of security and the methods to assure it which the President's Executive Order 10450 of April 27, 1953, propounds.

Finding himself in such an opposition of one against almost everybody, the scholar must be particularly careful in checking his position and that of the majority against the empirical evidence available to him. Could it be that he is more complacent and gullible and less sensitive to the requirements of security than the rest? Yet he has gone on record, in the face of vociferous opposition, in pointing to the error of virtually the whole academic community when in the thirties it dismissed the revelations of Communist infiltration in the government as nothing more than a partisan smear of the New Deal. And he remembers vividly how shocked he was by the laxity of security practices when he encountered them in person.

It is possible to explain the security system—which incidentally the present Administration has inherited and perfected but not created—as a psychological reaction to the laxity preceding it; it is impossible to defend it on rational and empirical grounds.

A critical analysis of the security regulations, as applied to the Department of State, must answer four basic questions: (1) What is to be secured? (2) Against whom is it to be secured? (3) By what means is it being secured? (4) What is the cost of security in terms of other objectives to which the nation is equally committed?

I

A security system must protect the integrity and secrecy of foreign policy. It has, first of all, to assure that the foreign policy of the United States is not determined by persons who owe primary loyalty to a foreign power and, hence, put its interests above those of the United States. If there had ever existed, as is widely but falsely believed, in the Department of State a pro-Communist clique who deliberately worked for the triumph of Communism in China, a security system would have to prevent such a situation from repeating itself.

It must, however, be said that the very mechanics by which the foreign policy of the United States is conducted make it extremely unlikely that such a situation could ever arise. The formation of American foreign policy is characterized by a diffusion so extreme as to border on chaos. A multitude of people on all levels of the governmental hierarchy are continuously called upon to analyze a certain political situation and to propose a policy dealing with it. Out of that welter of divergent opinions, certain basic propositions are slowly distilled which are submitted to the President for final approval. It is only when the President has spoken with the ultimate authority of his office, not infrequently choosing among alternative policies, that the foreign policy of the United States has been determined.

For a foreign power to subvert the foreign policy of the United States, a network of agents is needed strategically located not only in the Department of State but also in the other governmental establishments, such as the White House and the National Security Council, which are directly concerned with the determination of American foreign policy. No foreign power was able to establish such a network when American public opinion

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was hardly aware of the problem of security and when security regulations were extremely lax.

It stands to reason, of course, that genuine military secrets must be protected. The quality and quantity of weapons, the disposition of the armed forces, war plans, codes fall into that category. Insofar as the operations of the Department of State deal with such military secrets, they require protection on military grounds. Secret service operations with which the Department of State concerns itself must be protected on similar grounds. The considerations of the problem of secrecy in the Department of State that follow, then, apply exclusively to foreign policy proper.

I WAS once told by an official of the Department of State that from his long experience he could remember few documents the transmission of which would have been advantageous to a foreign power. From my own much more limited experience, I do not remember a single top secret document, let alone any document of a lower security classification, the knowledge of which would have been advantageous to a foreign power. I would go so far as to say that if a foreign power would gain knowledge of all the classified documents I have seen or written, such knowledge might benefit the United States rather than help that power, provided it would be advantageous to the United States to confound a foreign power as to the nature of our foreign policy and its future course. As concerns espionage with regard to foreign policy in general, it is hardly more than a racket, engaged in by shady characters frequently working both sides of the street. The typical information thus obtained is either phony, irrelevant, or public property.

That this cannot be otherwise, a consideration of foreign policy, especially as it must be practiced under present world conditions, will make obvious. The great lines of action which the foreign policies of the great powers are likely to take are predetermined by their respective national interests as they are rationally defined by the small group which ultimately decides upon the course of action. This has always been so and is so today. The Cold War has, however, imposed a peculiar rigidity upon the foreign policies of the great powers, which leaves very little room for maneuver in the implementation of their respective national interests. Given this situation, there can be hardly any secrets which rational analysis could not detect, but which espionage would be able to uncover. In order to know what Chinese policy with regard to Korea or Formosa is likely to be, it is not necessary, and probably not even expedient, to pilfer the secret files of the foreign office in Peking; it is only necessary to ask oneself what the national interest of China has been with regard to these two regions and what it is likely to be as interpreted by the present rulers of China.

The attempt to discern the foreign policy of the United States through espionage is bound to be even more fruit-

"A Threat to National Security"

"The conclusion has become inescapable . . . that a Foreign Service officer who reports on persons and events to the very best of his ability and who makes recommendations which at the time he conscientiously believes to be in the interest of the United States may subsequently find his loyalty and integrity challenged and may even be forced out of the service and discredited forever as a private citizen after many years of distinguished service.

"When any such tendency begins its insidious work it is not long before accuracy and initiative have been sacrificed to acceptability and conformity. The ultimate result is a threat to national security.

"The forces which are working for conformity from the outside are being reinforced by the present administrative set-up within the Department of State which subordinates normal personnel administration to considerations of security.

"It is obvious, of course, that candidates for the Foreign Service should be carefully investigated before appointment and that their work should at all times be under the exacting scrutiny of their professional superiors. But when initial investigation attaches undue importance to such factors as even a temporary departure from conservative political and economic views, casual association with persons holding views not currently in fashion or subscription to a periodical labeled as "liberal"; when subsequent investigation is carried to the point of delaying a promotion list for a year and routine transfers from one post to another; when investigations of individual officers must be kept up to date to within ninety days; when an easy path has been opened to even the anonymous informer; and when the results of these investigations are evaluated not by persons experienced in the Foreign Service or even acquainted at first hand with conditions abroad, but by persons of quite different experience, it is relevant to inquire whether we are not laying the foundations of a Foreign Service competent to serve a totalitarian government rather than the government of the United States as we have heretofore known it. . . ."

(From a communication to the *New York Times*, of January 17, 1954, signed by NORMAN ARMOUR, member of US Foreign Service 1915-1951, Ambassador to Chile, Argentina, Spain, and Assistant Secretary of State 1947-48; ROBERT WOODS BLISS, US Foreign Service 1903-45, Ambassador to Argentina, Special Assistant to Secretary of State 1942-44; JOSEPH C. GREW, US Foreign Service, 1904-1945, Ambassador to Japan and Under Secretary of State 1944-45; WILLIAM PHILLIPS, former ambassador to Italy, Special Envoy to India, and Under Secretary of State; G. HOWLAND SHAW, US Foreign Service 1917-1944, Chief of Foreign Service Personnel and Assistant Secretary of State 1941-44.

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less, due to the diffusion of the processes of government. No rational analysis could have anticipated with any degree of certainty what our policy with regard to Indo-China was likely to be in the summer of 1954, but it could have assessed the nature and strength of the divergent pressures which were brought to bear upon the President's mind, and the latter's likely reaction to them. As concerns foreign policy proper, again in contrast to military dispositions and planning, even a spy participating in the deliberations of the National Security Council and transmitting its minutes to a foreign government could not have revealed more than rational analysis was able to ascertain. In one word, what is needed for the performance of the vital task of assessing correctly the next move of the other side is not "intelligence" in terms of espionage, but intelligence in terms of rational analysis.

In truth, what needs protection from foreign subversion is not the whole process of foreign policy in all its ramifications but only those elements of it which, in the nature of things, are capable of being subverted, that is, that small area where decisions are actually made and which has access to military secrets and secret service operations. Secrecy in foreign policy serves not so much the security of the United States in terms of concealment of its plans and operations as it protects its officials who must be free to express their opinions without concern for the favorable or unfavorable reaction of outsiders. If the officials who are engaged in the conduct of foreign policy could not rely upon their official actions and expressions of opinion being made in confidence, they would at the very least be tempted to surrender their own professional judgment of the merits of the case to outside pressures, domestic and foreign. In the absence of secrecy, an official could not be expected to express his opinions about the personnel and policies of a foreign government without anticipating the reactions of that government. Nor could he be expected to express his opinions about the policies of his own government without regard for the political reactions on the domestic scene.

The main purpose of secrecy, then, is the protection of the professional integrity of the Foreign Service and affiliated agencies. Security regulations which seek to protect that professional integrity must obviously be different from those which seek to protect the United States against the betrayal of official secrets.

II

How can we determine beforehand who is likely to be disloyal if participation in the conduct of American foreign policy should be entrusted to him? Section 8 of Executive Order 10450 undertakes to answer that question. It enumerates close to 100 characteristics, any one of which excludes a man from government employment as a security risk, his employment being not "clearly consistent with the national security." Yet that list of characteristics, according to the preamble of Section 8, is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to establish general categories to which the security officials may add other related ones.

What the security regulations are trying to do here is to localize treason as an outstanding but surreptitious evil by making it a function of other outstanding but patent evils. In this philosophy a man who has deviated drastically in other respects from the moral standards of society is more likely to deviate from those moral standards by committing treason than one who has not so deviated. This assumption is illogical to begin with, and there is not a shred of empirical evidence to support it. Its illogical character stems from the very nature of treason which is an act of disloyalty committed by a person who, in view of his revealed qualities, appears to be deserving of trust. If it were possible to identify the prospective traitor by some outward quality, the commission of treason would by definition become impossible. That the assumption of a necessary relationship between general immorality and the particular immorality of treason also is untenable on empirical grounds can be shown by putting the following two questions to the empirical test: *Are people who deviate in a particular respect from the moral standards of society more likely to commit treason than others, and, are traitors as a type likely to be immoral in other aspects as well?*

In order to answer the first of these two questions, let us take the type of immorality which not only constitutes a particularly radical and repulsive violation of "normal" moral standards but which by general consensus is also most obviously conducive to treason: sexual perversion. That the homosexual is peculiarly prone to commit crimes under the threat of blackmail is hardly doubted by anyone who faces the problem for the first time. Yet neither the histories of diplomacy and of treason nor the recollections of practitioners of diplomacy, insofar as I could ascertain, contain an instance of a homosexual having committed an act of treason under the threat of blackmail. On the other hand, at least two notorious homosexuals have in recent history given outstanding diplomatic service: Prince Eulenburg, German Ambassador in Vienna from 1894-1902 and Baron von Hoesch, German Ambassador in Paris and London from 1924-36. While Eulenburg was finally ruined by the public revelations of his private life, he was never accused of disloyalty; and of Hoesch, Professor Holborn says that he was "the greatest of the German professional diplomatists of the interwar period . . . the sensitive and devoted man proved himself a master of his craft." Whatever one deems the proper treatment of the homosexual by government and society at large to be, there is no empirical evidence for a correlation of any kind between this particular type of deviation and the deviation of treason.

Nor is there any such evidence with regard to a very mild "deviation," completely devoid in itself of any negative moral connotation: that of having relatives be-

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hind the Iron Curtain. That an official who has relatives living behind the Iron Curtain is particularly susceptible to committing treason under blackmail sounds on the face of it so plausible that it is virtually accepted as self-evident. But who knows of an official who has violated security regulations under such circumstances? Here again, what on the face of it looks like common sense reveals itself on closer examination as superstition which unchallenged repetition has vested with the plausibility of truth.

APPROACHING the same problem from the side of treason, one cannot but arrive at the same conclusion. Throughout history all manner of men have committed treason: intelligent and stupid men, respected men and outcasts, sane men and mad men, idealists and mercenaries, believers and atheists, sober men and drunkards, faithful husbands and philanderers, scions of old families and sons of foreigners, even — to disprove Shakespeare's Julius Caesar—fat men as well as those with "a lean and hungry look." Yet if all kinds of men are capable of committing treason, only a few actually do commit it. Do they not wear the mark of Cain on their foreheads, which sets them visibly apart from the rest of humanity before they have committed their crime?

Alas, Cain and his tribe are not born with some outward sign which makes visible to all the deed they are to commit. It is their deed which marks them, not their nature. Nobody is born a traitor, but everybody can become one. Treason as betrayal of that to which one ought to be loyal is as an accomplished fact indeed peculiar but to a few; as a potentiality it is a curse common to all men. In whom that potentiality will become actual no man can foresee, not even the prospective traitor.

Executive Order 10450 assumes that there exist two easily discernible types of men, one likely to commit treason, the other not. The composite picture of the latter, which emerges from Executive Order 10450 and its application to the personnel of the Department of State, is the ideal type of a Babbitt with strong pseudo-puritanical connotations. He is a person who is "normal" in every respect, that is, who conforms to certain requirements which a "good" American is supposed to possess. In their application to the Department of State, these requirements run the whole gamut of actions, associations, attitudes and opinions with which a person might identify himself. Emphasis has been put upon conformity with a conservative ideal in the field of political opinion and attitudes, and with a pseudo-puritanical idea in the sphere of sexual behavior. In the course of security investigations, officials of the State Department have been asked about their attitude toward Franklin D. Roosevelt, the New Deal, and the recognition of the Communist government of China. Investigators have also shown an almost obsessive curiosity about the pre- and extra-marital sexual activities of officials.

Officials of the State Department have been asked about their attitude toward Franklin D. Roosevelt, the New Deal, and the recognition of the Communist government of China. Investigators have also shown an almost obsessive curiosity about the pre- and extra-marital sexual activities of officials.

It stands to reason that this ideal of the "good" American is at odds in one or the other respect with the actual behavior of most men who have ever lived and are now living. Hardly an American statesman from Franklin and Washington onwards has, and could have, lived up to it, and most of them would fail the test on multiple grounds. And it is not by accident that men of undoubted loyalty and merit have been dismissed from the Foreign Service as security risks under Executive Order 10450. For that executive order makes virtually everybody a security risk and for two reasons. First of all, as already pointed out, few men will correspond in every respect to the ideal picture of the "good" American which is implicit in Executive Order 10450 and its application. More importantly, few men will be so transparently good, approaching saintliness, that it can be said of them that their employment is "clearly consistent with the interests of the national security," which is the general standard repeated again and again by the executive order.

> I am myself indifferent honest: but yet I could accuse me of such things, that it were better my mother had not borne me: I am very proud, revengful, ambitious; with more offences at my beck than I have thoughts to put them in, imagination to give them shape, or time to act them in. What should such fellows as I do crawling between earth and heaven? We are arrant knaves all; believe none of us.

These words of Hamlet all men can say of themselves and of each other. Even the best man's goodness is darkened at least by the shadow of a doubt, and thus he is a security risk within the meaning of Order 10450.

It may be pointed out in passing that in the philosophy of Executive Order 10450 and the spirit of its application there reveals itself a deeply engrained tendency of our culture to externalize evil, localize it, reduce it thereby to seemingly intelligible and manageable proportions, and finally exorcise it by means of some social arrangement. Executive Order 10450 is the latest of such endeavors, all of necessity futile, of which the Volstead Act, trying to legislate virtue through prohibition, and the neutrality legislation, trying to legislate peace through isolation, are the most recent prominent examples.

III

The security regulations, as applied to the Department of State, operate essentially through three instrumentali-

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ties: security investigations, police supervision, and political pressure.

That a person be subjected to a security check before he is employed in a sensitive position by the Department of State is an obvious necessity. Yet in the eyes of the Department of State a man's loyalty is never settled once and for all (as actually it cannot be, in view of what we have said above). Since no man can ever be fully trusted, all men are forever suspect on grounds of security and, hence, are at all times subject to renewed security investigations. The case of Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., who underwent nine security investigations, has gained nationwide attention; yet his case is but an extreme example of a fairly typical situation.

This multiplication of security investigations is institutionalized by the requirement that the personnel file of every official of the Department of State in whose personnel status a change, such as a new assignment or promotion, is contemplated be checked for security. In the course of such a check any old incident which has been satisfactorily explained in preceding security investigations can jeopardize the official's career and destroy his reputation. An official who has been suggested for a promotion by virtue of his professional competence (of which compliance with security regulations is obviously a part) may be suspended for months as a security risk because 10 years ago, on the instigation of the government, he joined an organization infiltrated by Communists in order to combat their influence. Never mind that this incident was a matter of record from the very beginning, that it has been explained to the satisfaction of all concerned time and again; now it must be explained again and with it the whole life of the official, private and public, and it is he who must prove that the continuation of his employment is "clearly consistent with the interests of the national security," by collecting affidavits from public and private acquaintances testifying that they found nothing wrong with him.

The assumption that all men are really security risks and that this defect, shared by all men, can somehow be neutralized, if not eliminated, through the proper social arrangements cannot but give rise to a psychology which is indistinguishable from that of the police state. For given these two assumptions, eternal vigilance becomes the price of security. Treat everybody as though he were a traitor, and you will be safe from treason.

The Department of State has acted upon these assumptions and has established a system of supervision which in good part is supposed to operate covertly, but of which everybody within the Department is jokingly or indignantly aware. The Bureau of Security of the Department of State employs, of course, a staff whose personnel and functions are officially known. Aside from this official staff, it employs a network of agents (both categories estimated to total more than a thousand) whose identity and functions are not supposed to be known. Individuals have been placed in the different functional and geographic units of the Department of State for the ostensible purpose of performing the substantive functions of these units, yet for the actual purpose of supervising and reporting on their colleagues. Delegations to international conferences are accompanied by individuals who perform similar functions, traditionally associated with a GPU or Gestapo. The Secretary of State himself has invested this system with the authority of his office by imposing upon all officials of his Department through Department Circular 95 of April 15, 1954, the duty to be informers:

> I am aware that no agency of the government can improve, or even maintain, its level of effectiveness unless it is receiving a stream of new ideas and constructive criticisms. I hope that the inspection operation will be the focal reception point of that stream. I have told Mr. McLeod that in his capacity as administrator of the inspection operation he should be available at any time to receive personally from any of our people the benefit of their thinking on improving operations and procedures or on other problems, official and personal.
>
> In brief, I regard the internal inspection operation of the Department as one of its most important concerns. Its success will depend upon the co-operation and aid received generally from employees of the Department.

This emphasis upon the vital importance of investigation and supervision for purposes of security, institutionalized in a special bureau within the Department of State, has inevitably led to a shift of effective control over the operations of the Department from the Secretary and Under Secretary of State and the heads of the functional and geographic units to the Bureau of Security. This shift has occurred in all modern totalitarian states and has given rise to a phenomenon which has been aptly called the "dual state." It is characteristic of the "dual state" that in it, as a matter of law, the power of making decisions remains with the authorities charged by law with making them while, as a matter of fact, by virtue of their power over life and death, the agents of the secret police—co-ordinated to, but independent from the official makers of decision—at the very least exert an effective veto over the decisions. Once the secret police has established itself firmly in an agency of the government, it will have less and less need for intervening drastically in day-by-day operations; for its omnipresence and reputed omnipotence will generally be sufficient for the constituted authorities to avoid any action which might displease the secret police.

THE Bureau of Security in the Department of State, as originally constituted, was combined with and, hence, had direct control over four areas of operation: security, consular affairs, personnel, and inspection of United States mission abroad. While the Administrator of the Bureau of Security has been deprived of direct responsibility for the two latter functions, it is generally believed that he still retains effective control over per-

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sonnel because the office of personnel continues to be administered in the spirit of, and in close co-operation with, the Bureau of Security. Whether the formal separation of inspection from the Bureau of Security will have different results remains to be seen. However, it would be surprising if it should. For the powers of the Bureau of Security by themselves are all-pervading insofar as the hiring, assignment, promotion, and firing of personnel are concerned. Nor do its powers end there.

The powers which the Bureau of Security has assumed over the operations of the Department of State flow only in part from its police functions as such. The power of the Bureau of Security over the Department of State reflect in good measure the political power of those whose political philosophy its leading officials represent, to whom they owe their present positions and their primary loyalties as well. Those are not the President of the United States or the Secretary of State but certain members of Congress and, more particularly, of the Senate. The police system which has been established in the Department of State is their secret police in a more profound sense than it is the secret police of the executive branch. It is through it that these members of Congress are kept informed about the—presumably secret—operations of the Department of State, and it is through it that they exert a direct or indirect influence upon its operations.

This unofficial Department of State, operating within the framework of the official one, has been incapable of functioning as an instrument of a positive foreign policy. It has been able to hamstring, delay and prevent, but not initiate, foreign policy. Its attempts to sabotage the official foreign policy of the United States, as in the case of the Korean armistice, have been, as far as one can see, sporadic and inconsequential. This could have hardly been otherwise. For not only have those in charge of the operations of this unofficial Department of State been generally ignorant and ineffective, but they have also been—and this sheds an illuminating light upon the philosophy of the security system of the Department of State—essentially hostile to the very purposes and nature of foreign policy.

For them, all men are suspect as traitors, but diplomats in particular are so. For they deviate in certain obvious respects from the ideal type of the "normal" good American: they know foreign languages, spend much of their lives abroad, have many contacts with foreigners, concern themselves professionally with foreign countries—and they tend to be intellectuals, committing their brains rather than their passions to the conduct of foreign policy. Thus it is not by accident that an enterprise which starts out to protect the integrity and secrecy of American foreign policy transforms itself, as we have seen, into an undertaking to assure conformity and ends in an attempt to make the United States safe from foreign policy as such. What began as a technical operation to improve the protection of the United States against subversion and espionage has matured into an onslaught—"know-nothing" in its philosophy and isolationist in its implicit purpose—against the very existence of an active American foreign policy.

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IV

Obviously, to preserve the integrity and secrecy of foreign policy is only one among many objectives to which the United States is committed. A policy, however sound and successful in its own terms, must be evaluated in terms of the impact it has upon other national objectives, as important or even more important than its own. Such scrutiny is particularly required for a policy which is so unsound and unsuccessful as we believe the security policy of the Department of State to be. What, then, has been the price we have had to pay in terms of equally or more important objectives, for the security policy of the Department of State? That price is being paid primarily in three areas: the effectiveness of American foreign policy, the prestige of the United States abroad, and the security of the United States.

For an impartial professional observer, the conclusion is inevitable that today, more than a year after the letter by the five diplomats, quoted on page 9, was written, the Department of State, as presently constituted, is hardly competent to serve any government, totalitarian or otherwise. Not only the morale but also the professional competence and capacity for teamwork of its members have drastically declined. The Department of State which the present Administration inherited was, to say the least, a useful instrument of foreign policy. Its obvious administrative weaknesses were compensated for by the intellectual ability, technical competence, and devotion of most of its top and middle layer officials. Many of these officials have either been dismissed or have voluntarily resigned. Of the officials of this type with whom our High Commission in Germany was staffed two years ago, not a single one is said to be left today. They could not have been replaced even under the best possible circumstances with a new team of equal competence and experience. For no nation is rich enough in diplomatic talent, demanding a rare combination of extraordinary qualities of mind and character, to be able to afford taking one team out of the game and replacing it with another one equally good. What is possible in football cannot be done in diplomacy.

The United States could not have afforded the loss of its ablest diplomatists even under the best of circumstances. Yet the circumstances under which the United States had to make good this loss were far from being

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the best. A system which makes security the overriding consideration gives a golden opportunity for advancement to the incompetent, the time server, and the informer, who has never uttered a wrong thought and who has never associated with the wrong person. A system which not only does not require professional competence but actually suspects it cannot help but use standards of selection congenial to it.

Not only has there been deterioration at the top and in the middle layers of the departmental hierarchy, but there has also been starvation at the bottom. A system characterized by repeated security investigations, police supervision, and political pressure has depleted the lower ranks of the Foreign Service. Many younger officials have been dismissed as security risks, and many more have resigned of their own volition. What is worse is that such a system must act as a deterrent upon both application for employment and employment itself. The number of graduates of our institutions of higher learning who today choose to make the Foreign Service their career is small as compared with that of three or four years ago. The few who apply today may be the bravest and the most desperate, but they can hardly be the best; and those who are able to pass the security test and are actually hired will not be necessarily the best of them, and even many of them resign soon in disgust.

In consequence, the personnel of the Department of State has drastically declined in quantity and quality. Hundreds of positions remain continuously unfilled, sometimes for many months, because the Bureau of Security has failed to clear the appointees. This depletion has gone so far that positions in important countries, requiring constant contacts with representatives of foreign public opinion, must be filled with persons who have spent all their official life outside not only this particular country but this particular continent and who are ignorant of the native language. This same depletion accounts, at least in part, for the marked tendency to fill top diplomatic posts with individuals whose professional qualifications are obscure but whose political claims are only too obvious.

THIS decline in the quality and quantity of the personnel of the State Department is matched by the decline in the quality of its operations. Objective analytical reporting, the prime function of diplomacy, has fallen to a low ebb in our Foreign Service. The reports of our diplomats are no longer as regularly read by the officials at the respective geographic desks in Washington as they were in time past, for they contain frequently nothing more than digests of the newspapers of the countries concerned, which the official in Washington can and does read himself. Heads of missions have refused to allow the transmission to Washington of reports painting a picture of the local situation at variance either with reports of other agencies or with the estimate of the situation prevailing in Washington.

This abdication of independent judgment is, of course, the result of the fear that deviation from the "official line" might jeopardize one's very livelihood and reputation. Yet this fear is more than the subjective anticipation of an evil which is largely imaginary, as is much of the fear of being "controversial," so prevalent in academic life. That fear is, indeed, the fruit of bitter experience. Officials have been dismissed for having reported facts which they were not supposed to report, and for having advocated policies which they were not supposed to advocate.

Under the impact of all these influences, the Department of State is probably not more immune to subversion and treason than it was before. A case could even be made for the proposition that an official whom the "dual state" constantly subjects to the moral stress of having to reconcile his own professional judgments and moral principles with those of the organization in which he works may become particularly prone to laxity and failure of judgment in matters of security. In any event, the Department of State has ceased to be the eyes, ears, and brains of the foreign policy of the United States.

THIS disintegration of the Foreign Service of the United States is better known abroad than it is at home. The governments and public opinion of foreign countries have seen with amazement officials of whose competence and loyalty they have had tangible evidence investigated, dismissed, or forced to resign as security risks. Continuous contacts with our representatives abroad provide them with unmistakable evidence of the diminution of their professional competence. This writer who has recently had occasion to ask officials, political leaders, and journalists of European countries what they think of the Foreign Service of the United States has been shocked and dismayed by the instances of individual incompetence reported to him, by the invidious comparisons with times past, and by the condescension and contempt to be found at every turn.

It must, however, be said that this dark picture is brightened by a few light spots. Due to luck, personal connections, or the inefficiency of the security system, there have remained in the Department of State a few, and ever diminishing number, of officials who have not yielded to the pressures which incessantly bear upon them. Forsaken from above, spied upon from below, surrounded by all manner of opportunists and worse, they risk their careers, their positions, and their honor in maintaining for themselves and in defending in their subordinates the traditional standards of intellectual integrity, professional competence, and devotion to duty. If and when out of the ruins of today a new foreign service will be built, worthy of the traditions and the mission of America, the nation will owe a great debt to these brave, able, and devoted men who defend in obscurity and against great odds the pitiful remnants of a fine tradition.

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

Will We Live on Air?

What the Photosynthesis Experiments Mean

by Bruce Bliven

HIGH on a hillside in Berkeley, California, looking down upon the magnificent panorama of the Golden Gate, there is a laboratory devoted to research in plant nutrition. From it there may come, in the next few years, news of incalculable benefit to all mankind. We may learn, from its researches, how to unlock one of the greatest of all mysteries—photosynthesis, how growing plants produce food from carbon dioxide and water, in the presence of sunlight. If we can, the age-old dream of synthetic food, produced at almost no cost, may be within our grasp.

Already, largely through the work of a team of research scientists headed by a quiet, 44-year-old plant physiologist, Dr. Daniel Arnon, we have learned the major successive steps in photosynthesis. We have also learned that there is a blue-green algae, *Anabaena cylindrica*, a cousin of the famous *Chlorella*, which can fix large quantities of nitrogen from the air and make it available to growing plants—a discovery that may be of tremendous practical use in the near future.

Other researchers, headed by Dr. Melvin Calvin, also at the University of California and working in the same field, have made additional fundamental discoveries in the same general area. These discoveries suggest that possibly we may some day produce electricity in useful quantities directly from sunlight.

Photosynthesis is the most important natural process on earth, and the one on which all life depends. Human beings live on its products or on animals that do so, directly or indirectly. Carbohydrates are produced by the plant from carbon dioxide and water. Fats and oils come from carbohydrates worked upon by plant enzymes, while proteins are synthesized with the aid of nitrogen from the air or the soil.

The great achievement of Dr. Arnon and his team was accomplished with the aid of radioactive isotopes—"tagged atoms"—and especially those of carbon dioxide and phosphorus. The chlorophyll, the essential green substance in the plant, exists in small particles called chloroplasts. These, with the aid of sunlight, are able to split water into hydrogen and oxygen. Part of the oxygen goes off into the air, but another part is used, in a complex process, to create vitamins and an important substance, adenosine triphosphate—the substance that delivers energy to your muscles and enables them to move.

The three key vitamins that are manufactured within the chloroplast are riboflavin (one of the vitamin B complex) and vitamins K and C. Carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, the three most important elements in all foods, combine and recombine, in complicated ways; other substances are added — sulphur, potassium and nitrogen among them. The process is not only highly complex but extremely rapid, some of the transformations, under the influence of natural catalysts, taking place in a brief fraction of a second. Not all the steps are fully understood yet, and we are probably still some distance from being able to duplicate on a large scale what nature does. Yet the mystery of the ages has been solved. We know the essential facts.

DR. ARNON, central figure in this research, has A.B. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California, where he teaches. He is married and the father of five children. He spent three years in the Army, and one year as a Guggenheim Fellow at Cambridge University in England; in 1940, when he was only 29, he received the Newcomb Cleveland Prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Science for distinguished research. He is a past president of the American Society of Plant Physiologists.

Dr. Calvin's contribution has also been an important one. Small as the chloroplasts are, they contain still smaller units called plastids. Sunlight activates the electrons in the molecules of the plastids, for a few thousandths of a second. The question was, how does this extremely short-lived energy become permanent? Working with radioactive carbon 14, Dr. Calvin's team of researchers has solved this riddle. In the molecules of the plastids there are sulfur atoms bonded together, two at a time. The excitation of the light breaks the bond, and the energy then becomes a continuing characteristic of the two molecular fragments. Apparently the light directly excites the electrons, which suggests the possibility (already partly confirmed in other ways) of creating electric current directly from sunlight.

If we could merely duplicate what nature does in the first step in photosynthesis, separating hydrogen and oxygen, another tremendously important source of energy at negligible cost could be attained. Dr. Dean Burk, head of the cyto-chemistry unit of the National Cancer Institute at Bethesda, Maryland, himself an outstanding authority on photosynthesis, has suggested that if we

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could learn to do this, we could burn the hydrogen as a substitute for today's fossil fuels.

If synthetic food—the dream of mankind for centuries—were to become available, would it cause a violent economic revolution, and a temporary economic collapse? Dr. Arnon thinks that the development is likely to come slowly, as a supplement to, and not a substitute for, present agriculture. He suggests that the first uses may be for bulk chemicals, themselves flavorless, the raw materials for foods. Eventually, of course, the changes would be profound. Deserts might become the chief centers of food production. Whole civilizations might be transplanted. The curse of Malthus—world overpopulation—might be pushed far into the future.

Two of Dr. Arnon's experiments have been achieved with spinach and with rice. He was able to take the chloroplasts from spinach and make them grow outside the living plant. He has succeeded in reproducing the cycle through which starch is synthesized from carbon dioxide and water. Starch, of course, is practically sugar; if we were not already producing sugar cheaply, Dr. Arnon's technique could be used for this purpose. By the use of the blue-green algae mentioned above, Dr. Arnon was able to grow rice with only nitrogen from the atmosphere—where the supply is so huge that it might be called limitless. The efficiency of the algae in the process is about 200 times greater than had previously been believed. Adding the algae to rice fields should produce important quantitative and qualitative inprovement.

The political and social consequences of unlimited production of food at nominal cost need little underlining. Said Dr. Arnon, of the possibility that we can duplicate photosynthesis independently of green plants: "Should this prove attainable, it would usher in a new era of unlimited abundance." Today about 1.6 billion people, roughly two-thirds of the world's population, never get enough to eat. The Cold War between the Western democracies and the Communists is largely a struggle for control of these many millions of people. If their food problem can be solved, the repercussions will be dramatic and far-reaching.

If the discovery came soon, its importance might be even more sensational—so much so that it might become the most important military-political fact in the world. Russia is notoriously short of food today; her relations with China, for example, will be largely dictated by the hope of getting food in large quantities from that country. What would happen if all these strings were suddenly cut dizzies the imagination.

How close are we to such development? While it is impossible to predict with any accuracy, some competent authorities believe that we may be as close as we were to the secret of atomic energy in, say, 1939. This does not mean, however, that the riddle is likely to be solved completely in another six years. Under the impetus of war, atomic research was enormously speeded, the United States spending millions of dollars in what was by far the greatest piece of scientific research in all history. While work on photosynthesis is going forward briskly, at the University of California, at Bethesda and in other places, it has only pennies to spend where atomic research had thousands. Perhaps we ought to consider whether it would be well to spend a little more here, even though it might need to be taken from weapons research.

Thad Snow, the Farmer

by Webster Schott

THAD SNOW was called the Sage of Southeast Missouri, or rather "Swampeast" Missouri, as he christened the Mississippi delta country which starts sloping below St. Louis and slides into the river around Cairo, Ill. He was called the devil by plenty of cotton-plantation owners during the 1939 sharecroppers strike. He was also called the best damned farmer in Missouri. And learning of his death last January 15, his acquaintances everywhere must have momentarily paid tribute to all of the men who were the one man named Thad Snow: wit, writer, intellectual, homemade philosopher, government adviser, great liberal and good friend of mankind.

But the finest observance of Thad Snow's death took place down the road from his Charleston, Mo., farmhouse. On the day he was buried, the American flag on the frame Negro schoolhouse there stood at half-mast.

When this friend of James Whitcomb Riley came to Missouri in 1910 from Greenfield, Ind., where he was born in 1881, Southeast Missouri was the last frontier in the Midwest. An engineer once told him that he and the other delta-county pioneers moved more dirt to drain their land than it took to dig the Panama Canal. Thad Snow didn't carve a place for himself in the Missouri wilderness. He dug it out of the Missouri swamp. And then he farmed it, 1,000 acres of it.

Thad Snow had a unique will and way with animals and crops. He once got a Missouri mule to tow two boxcars along a railroad. He trained a cow to wet her nose and shift broadside into the wind when he approached her with a milk pail. Singlehandedly he once brought 500 head of old and new-born pigs and sheep

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through a winter without any grain. He got them to eat alfalfa hay, which just wasn't done. He taught dogs to sort animals according to size and quality, and to make ewes adopt lambs which weren't their own. He got cotton to grow in the strange corn-and-wheat land of Missouri. He moved his family back to his muddy tracts after four or five heart-breaking Mississippi floods, and still made the land pay. He lost everything in 1930, borrowed money, got his farm back, and paid off his debts.

Thad Snow was a New Deal farmer. He organized the first credit corporation set up under the Farm Loan Act. He worked hard to help a gigantic Farm Security Administration co-operative plantation succeed down in the Delta. His attacks on agriculture bureaucrats who had never farmed were impatient, but he never missed an opportunity to praise Henry Wallace's secretaryship. He was in the front when more than 4,000 farmers traveled to Washington in 1935 to thank Wallace and Franklin Roosevelt for salvation.

If Thad Snow had never written a word for publication, he still would have become a legend in Southeast Missouri. But he was an individualist (how he despised that word when it was linked with "rugged") who had to say his piece in public as well as in private. It was not possible to predict where Thad Snow would stand on an issue. Just that it wouldn't be on a fence. And for 25 years Thad Snow's fertile and ranging mind reached into the letters-to-the-editor column of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. He wrote to the *Post* about everything from the folly of the Corps of Engineers and the catastrophe of floods to the legend of Horse Hollow and his visit in Mexico with Leon Trotsky. The letters came fresh out of a cracker barrel—crisp, white and salted. They were not great letters, but they were a bit of Swampeast Missouri humor, practicality and pacifism planted in the big city and eventually in the big country.

Some of the most cutting letters Thad Snow ever wrote had to do with a calamity and for a cause that could have taken his life: the 1939 sit-down strike of Southeast Missouri Negro cotton sharecroppers.

On the night of January 9, 1939, several hundred croppers who were being fleeced out of their croppers' shares of government payments under the Farm Control Law moved with their families off the plantations and camped on the highways of Southeast Missouri. Within a few days the roads were electric with flashbulbs. Nearly a thousand protesting croppers in their ragged blanket tents in the snow were shaming Missouri plantation owners in more newspapers and magazines than they knew existed.

In their vacuity the local cotton bosses couldn't believe the Negroes capable of organizing such a strike by themselves. But they did, as Thad Snow revealed for the first time two months before his death, when Houghton Mifflin Company published his autobiography, *From Missouri*. The mass hysterics had to have a devil, Snow observed, or some lynchings. So when asked, he refused to say he hadn't masterminded the strike. He got the devil's job. Then at the height of the mass hatred, he made fools of the fools by publishing a detailed "confession" which told how the strike had been planned in Mexico by himself and Leon Trotsky with the approval of Ambassador Josephus Daniels, President Cardenas, President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Upton Sinclair, Al Smith, Norman Thomas, Dorothy Thompson and Frank Hague and a few others. The hysteria cannibalized itself; Snow came out safely, and the only public disavowal he made was in a cagey letter to the *Post-Dispatch*:

> . . . I might have had less to do with it than the man in the moon; because undoubtedly some of the union meetings were held on moonlight nights.

After the strike had served its purpose, he helped get the croppers back on the land and went to Washington to assist in rewriting the law the plantation owners had circumvented. It was a labor of love.

How do you classify a man like Thad Snow? Was he the democratic product of one of our last frontiers and of a social-economic revolution? Should we record him as the farmer who lectured to Harvard economists, fought for better roads and cheap electricity, offered politicians wisdom instead of semantic abstractions? A backwoods epigrammatist?

All for the good, but they are manifestations of the man inside. And the man inside, when he heard Dean Acheson speak about Communism's "threat to our great concepts . . . our self-respect and the integrity of our mind and spirit," well, Thad Snow put it down in his book that

> . . . My "concepts" are my own; not Dean Acheson's. Nor is he the custodian of my self-respect, or my "integrity of mind and spirit." He cannot scare me about these things, because he can do absolutely nothing about them, one way or the other. Nor can Mr. Joseph Stalin.

That's the kind of man Thad Snow was, and that's why the flag belonged at half-mast at the schoolhouse. He was deep in the American grain, with his hands and with his mind. He was from the land.



Thomas Hart Benton

Flood Country

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Aristocratic View of Statesmanship

by John G. Pearson

ONE of the most frequently quoted pieces from Walter Bagehot's book on *The English Constitution* is the beginning of his second chapter on the monarchy, in which Queen Victoria and the future Edward VII were treated with such delightful, such astringent functionalism. "The use of the Queen," it begins. He might have written about the use of the stock market or the use of the railway system in exactly the same way:

> The use of the Queen in a dignified capacity is incalculable. Most people when they read that the Queen walked on the slopes at Windsor—that the Prince of Wales went to the Derby—have imagined that too much thought and prominence were given to little things. But they have been in error; and it is nice to trace how the actions of a retired widow and an unemployed youth become of such importance.

"A retired widow," "an unemployed youth"—the shock is exciting. What cynicism! What brutality! And in an article which appeared on Bagehot only the other day Bagehot was seen as a brutal writer. One, it was hinted, who, like an early Lytton Strachey, took a delight in being nasty to the Victorians almost for nastiness' sake.

This I believe is entirely untrue. Bagehot was not a cynical man, nor was he a brutal writer. He was something far deeper and far subtler. He was an acute realist, and, as most realists have to be, he was a very cautious, almost a timid person.

Bagehot gave up the law in 1851, when he was twenty-five, and plunged into the realities of his father's banking business. He studied literature, and his economic studies involved a most breathtaking attempt to explain the precise function, not just of man the money-making animal, but the varying motives and organizations which produced the delicate and subtle complexities of modern society. The result of this was to give Bagehot a mild attack of political hypochondria. It never got to the advanced stage of wanting to put the government to bed and making it stay there in case it hurt itself by moving. He was not afraid of the body politic moving, but he was afraid of it moving too fast, and he had a morbid fear of operations; of the bungling fingers of the political surgeon, cutting and slicing the flesh that was so much more delicate than any of the surgeons whom Bagehot knew could ever appreciate.

This fear of the political surgeon had appeared most dramatically when Bagehot at the age of twenty-five, had witnessed the *coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon in 1851, and had written his account of what had occurred in the Unitarian newspaper, *The Enquirer*. The readers of *The Enquirer*, sober, peace-loving Unitarians, read a very straightforward justification of Napoleon. The justification of Napoleon's repressive measures was that the parliamentary freedom had been abused by the politicians, and that society as a result was in danger, which only Napoleon's order could prevent.

At the heart of Bagehot's thought, even then, is the insistence that human life, order, the fabric of society, are more important than any political theory or freedom. "The first duty of society," he wrote, "is the preservation of society. Parliaments, liberty, leading articles, essays, eloquence, all are good but all are second." In the disorders in Paris Bagehot had seen the barricades, and had felt intimately the narrow boundary between order and anarchy, once politics get out of hand. In everything he subsequently wrote there is always a feeling that Bagehot slightly fears and slightly despises politics.

BUT Bagehot, during the 17 years he was editor of *The Economist*, was writing a regular two articles a week on practical politics, and *The English Constitution* is a working manual of how the political life of the country proceeded. How, then, did he account for the continued miracle of English politics? What was it that held things together throughout society?

The answer is that Bagehot saw a large number of forces holding society together which, as a rational, civilized, tolerant human being, he could hardly have approved of. He saw that the dissolution of society which he feared was prevented by what he called the "tyranny of the commonplace, which seems to accompany civilization." He writes:

> You may talk of the tyranny of Nero and Tiberius, but the real tyranny is the tyranny of your next-door neighbor. What espionage of despotism comes to your door so effectively as the eye of the man who lives at your door? Public opinion is a permeating influence. It requires us to think other men's thoughts, to speak other men's words, to follow other men's habits.

He saw how the respect of the countryman for his local betters would often prevent the clever man getting into parliament: "A common clever man going into the country would get no reverence, but the old squire would get reverence." He saw how simple snobbery, the envy which the new moneyed classes felt for the old aristocrats, was keeping politics themselves in order and preventing the worship of money which he saw in America, or the worship of the political bureaucracy which he saw in France, sweeping the country. Finally, he saw how politicians themselves were usually a dull lot:

> At present the political conversation of Members of Parliament—a few of the greatest excepted—is less able and less striking than that of other persons of fair capacity.

The one thing which is certain about Bagehot himself is that he did not like any of these social habits. He was the last person to have approved of the tyranny of the commonplace, the last person to have welcomed the second-rate intellect. He was one of the least snobbish, one of the least intolerant men of his age, and, as a man who in attempting to get into parliament for a country district had been himself defeated by the blind reverence of the country voter for the local squire, he was hardly likely to have felt any warm affection for rustic deference. But, while

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he saw the personal unpleasantness of these qualities, he also saw their social importance. They were none of them particularly estimable in themselves, but they held society together. They produced what he called a "deferential nation." Only in such a nation could our institutions function, and, as he wrote himself, "good government is well worth a great deal of social dullness."

It was this which laid Bagehot open to the charge of cynicism and brutality, for he was in the unpleasant situation of having to believe that the human life which he most valued and the human virtues which he most enjoyed depended largely upon qualities which were their exact opposite in the political field. Politics was a very necessary, but a rather nasty business.

WHEN he was in Paris in 1851 Bagehot had been puzzled about why the parliamentary system, which was political meat for the English, was political poison for the French, and had explained the curious fact in terms of national development. There were, he wrote, "breeds in the animal man just as there were breeds in the animal dog," and the breed Englishman had developed different characteristics from the breed Frenchman. At this time he thought that "the formation of this character is one of the most secret of marvellous mysteries" but by 1867 he had read Darwin and he had read Maine and he had studied enough of the current accounts of the habits of primitive peoples to feel confident enough to probe this secret and expose this mystery in his book *Physics and Politics*. The book represents Bagehot at his most confident and most optimistic, and when he wrote of the progress of nations he saw its highest manifestation so far in the civilization of nineteenth-century England which he was personally acquainted with. Skillfully he adapted the theories of natural selection to the development of this civilization itself.

This is easy enough to do in terms of primitive societies. Anything which strengthens the fighting prowess of the group, whether it be a new type of weapon or a new sort of social organization, would strengthen that group against the rest. The fittest state which survived would be the fittest militarily. Bagehot, however, was not interested in the military virtues, but in the human ones—in reason, in religion, in toleration; and in *Physics and Politics* these were the virtues in terms of which he attempted to interpret the development of society.

The merciful alliance of industrial and commercial wealth with some aristocratic culture and the British constitutional system in the 1860's helped Bagehot in his task. Britain was top dog. She was also a fairly cultured dog, and a fairly free dog. Certainly the freest, most cultured, most powerful dog around; and Bagehot tried to convince her that her power really depended upon her freedom and her culture.

THE argument is ingenious. Societies do not develop in one straightforward bound, but in two. In the first bound the important thing is the obedience, the cohesion of the group. Law, caste, religion, all are authoritative, all are permanent, and the society is ruled by what Bagehot called the cake of custom. But in the second bound the cake of custom is shattered. Beliefs accepted for centuries are suddenly questioned, choice and reason prevail and a new age, the age of discussion and progress begins. Bagehot writes:

> If after ages of waiting a nation can have order and choice together, at once the fatal clog is removed, and the orderly springs of progress begin their elastic motion.

"The orderly springs of progress." This was, for Bagehot, the way out of the Hobbesian situation of politics in which his analysis of the English Constitution had landed him. If it was true, as he wrote in *Physics and Politics*, that "the cultivation of a fine taste tends to promote a fine judgment which is a main help in the complex world of civilized existence," the electorate ought to be getting progressively more enlightened, automatically more discriminating; and the danger of social disintegration which was only warded off by the deferential nature of society should become increasingly less.

Clearly Bagehot did not believe in the automatic working of fine taste and judgment in any labor party. But there was still one hope for society. Even the unskilled, Bagehot thought, might be deferential. The 1870's according to Bagehot, were the statesman's last chance in England. The political parties must resist the temptation to outbid each other for the support of the unthinking, unskilled masses. Instead the statesman's duty is "to guide the new voters in the exercise of their franchise." It should be easy enough. "Much argument is not needed to guide the public, still less formal exposition." A manly utterance of clear conclusions was all that was necessary. The discretion and the appeal of the English gentleman could still save the day.

But could Bagehot have believed that such a statesman would appear? It is extremely doubtful, for the political hypochondria he felt over the body politic led him to set up the most exacting standards for his statesmen. They were standards by which all his contemporaries fell. He used to breakfast with Gladstone, but he wrote that Gladstone was too much of an orator, too much concerned with convincing his immediate hearers, to have an original policy or mature and consistent designs. Gladstone surprisingly enough agreed that there was a lot of truth in this. Disraeli was worse still: hare-brained and reckless, a guerrilla leader, he had, thought Bagehot, no real influence on the country.

THE truth was that Bagehot's acuteness of mind had led him to seek a perfection in society and politics never to be found this side of paradise. He was a profound but an over-interested onlooker. He saw changes in society which most politicians seemed to ignore, which most politicians were incapable of dealing with, and yet which would vitally affect the society he knew so well. At

OF SPECIAL INTEREST
TO NR READERS

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3. *On Cain & Humphrey*—Murray Kempton

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the same time he saw that in the past, government had been made acceptable by a compromise over human weaknesses. He was now skeptical about whether this old compromise would continue to work.

Physics and Politics appeared as a hopeful way out, but it was clearly one in which he could not very seriously believe. Similarly his refusal to desert his belief in the top ten thousand and the civilized virtues, prevented him ever feeling anything but terror at the widening of the vote and at the new political forces in society. And so, with a note of resigned disquiet, he gave up hope of finding the great statesman "capable of dealing with the consequences of new creations and the structure of an unseen future." He wrote about Robert Peel:

> So long as constitutional statesmanship is what it is now, so long as its function consists in recording the views of a confused nation, so long as success in it is confined to minds plastic, changeful, administrative, we must hope for no better man. You have excluded the profound thinker: you must be content with what you can obtain—the business gentleman.

Descriptions of Inner Reality

by Paul Engle

WRITING a novel that gets inside the human mind, says Mr. Edel, quoting the brilliant phrase of William James, is like turning up the gas to see what the dark is like. Of course the dark disappears, but in that fragment of a second when the light moves toward the darkness, "the precious moment of pure time" can be caught. It is with novels which are largely concerned with catching as many of these glowing moments as possible that this excellent study is concerned.

The Psychological Novel 1900-1950, by Leon Edel (Lippincott; $3).

Marcel Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past* was published in 1913, James Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* in 1914, and Dorothy Richardson's first volume of *The Pilgrimages* in 1915. Thus in a burst of time appeared three novels which shaped the sequences of fiction in this century. All of them, says Edel, were novels of internal reality rather than of the outer world in the manner of Balzac. But they also were essentially autobiographical, were infused with the language of poetry, and involved search, voyage, pilgrimage through consciousness.

But this inner reality is elusive, compared to those external actions which are the substance of the conventional novel. Edel quotes William James again on thought as a lighted center with a "halo" of other thoughts. If we try to seize those thoughts, do they not disappear in the instant, "as a snowflake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer a crystal but a drop?" The answer here is that it is not a concrete thought merely that is the novelist's concern, but the emotion with which the character holds it, and beyond that, the intensity of that emotion. To demonstrate the intensity, the novelist takes us inside the mind of the person, as an older novelist took us inside a house and showed us the quality and detail of the furnishings. And it is because these novels are finally concerned not with objective reality but with intensities of feeling (however much the latter may be contained in the real details) that such novels are often difficult and elusive.

It is doubtful that fiction could receive a more sympathetic and perceptive treatment then Mr. Edel gives it here. In page after page he peels back the superficial aspects of Joyce and Proust to reveal the inner, living layer. In his remarks on Faulkner he readily relates him to the Joyce of the *Portrait*. And his comment on Virginia Woolf is the most insightful I have read:

> There is no attempt at portrait painting; rather does she try to evoke a state of feeling by a kind of mental poesy. The same vein of poetry runs through all the minds she creates for us. It is as if she had created a single device or convention, to be applied universally, in the knowledge that the delicacy of her perception, the waves of feeling, will wash over her readers as she washes them over her characters. This is alike her achievement and its fatal flaw. The bright flame-like vividness of her books created beautiful illuminated surfaces. There is no tragic depth in them, only the pathos of things lost and outlived, the past irretrievable or retrieved as an ache in the present.

In this remark is more of the weakness of the psychological novel than Mr. Edel seem inclined to admit. In a sense, it is Dublin and not Bloom, London and not Mrs. Dalloway, Paris and not Swann, that dominates each of the great novels of their authors. The individual seems to blur, even when it is an individual memory with which the reader is presented. Then what other uniqueness do these intense novels offer? Edel quotes Joyce on the personality of the artist, which "finally refines itself out of existence, impersonalizes itself." The artist remains, like God, beyond his handiwork, indifferent, paring his fingernails. And yet these novels may be the most artist-involved of all, divulging more of the writer than of any character in the narrative. As Edel remarks, "there remains a quality of mind that informs a work, no matter how much the artist has disengaged himself." The final inner reality is the mind of the artist.

The one flaw which this otherwise rich and helpful book presents concerns Edel's remark that we deal "not with the state of health of the artist but the art itself." Here he overlooks much of the body of the very fiction which he has been revealing, for he himself urged that these were strongly autobiographical, and if so, then the health of the artist is surely relevant, his emotional, moral, as well as physical health. Proust's cork-lined room, his asthma, certainly affected his fiction, as Joyce's blindness surely must have exaggerated his care for sound as ever against visual detail. These massive inner novels hardly exist apart from the personalities of their creators, and yet a Shakespeare play, a Balzac novel, do so exist. The other neglect in the book is the realization that art does re-create life, but in doing so creates a new shape altogether, which is the life of the work of art in the real world.

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TELEVISION

BROADWAY came to Main Street on March 28 when the 1955 "ANTA Album," a two-hour assortment of hit numbers from hit shows past and present, was televised from the stage of New York's Adelphi Theatre onto screens in thirty-two movie houses with a total seating capacity of 80,000 persons. The occasion marked the union of the Broadway stage and closed-circuit television.

For the first time thousands of spectators many hundreds of miles from Manhattan were able to enjoy a night at the theatre, at prices ranging from two to ten dollars a seat. And, more significant for the new medium, television was for two hours freed from the living room, from the bosom of the family. The kiddies were home, sleeping presumably; the more lethargic adults were sighing over the domestic tribulations of a TV household; or they may have been held fast by Wrestling from Chicago. But the movie houses were offering real Theatre.

This is not to suggest that the evening was all triumph. The "ANTA Album" performers frequently looked like figures in an eerily lighted El Greco painting; some of the dancers seemed bent on crashing into a stray TV camera, while others seemed unnerved by the prospect of crashing; the big chorus scenes were, on the whole, not very far removed from standard TV fare.

But there were many good things. Some like Ruth Draper's "The Scottish Immigrant at Ellis Island" or Victor Borge's inimitable spoofing of a Mozart opera, could (with just a little cleaning up of the latter) have been equally effective on the 21-inch screen. 11 others, however, the truly exciting peaks of the evening, would never do for the living room TV family audience and would be forbidden to movie audiences by the Code of the Motion Picture Producers Association of America. Those few minutes of Tennessee Williams' *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof* and William Inge's *Bus Stop* were enough to remind the TV viewer of the dramatic excitement he hasn't been experiencing lately. Beside them, even the better put-together TV efforts have the punch of a church annual.

Financially, the closed-circuit innovation may lend assistance where assistance is sorely needed. Broadway has every reason to welcome it. Rising production costs have been steadily forcing ticket prices beyond the reach of most New Yorkers and have laid so heavy a burden on a play that unless it achieves smash status, it can barely expect to survive. A single successful closed-circuit performance of a new offering could pay for its entire initial cost of production at one gala swoop.

There will be other beneficiaries. Motion picture houses have been shutting down as television has come up. If the closed-circuit idea develops and prices are kept in line, a number of movie exhibitors will find they have a new and very profitable regular attraction to sustain them in the video age.

As for audiences residing outside the commuting area of Forty-fourth Street who nevertheless crave professional theatre not written with an eye on the sensibilities of maiden aunts or the nourishment of small-fry appetites they may receive some compensation for their years of placid acceptance of "Robert Montgomery Presents" as the very epitome of dramatic treat to which one may aspire. At its best the home screen can give us a delightful *Peter Pan* — with commercials—and an occasional literate script competently interpreted. It can't give us *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*— at least not in its original edition.

Closed-circuit television is not *living* professional theatre, but it is a reasonable facsimile, and it does not need a very large audience, as TV audiences run, to show a profit. Its advocates claim that it will encourage the production of experimental plays and of the classics. This seems somewhat optimistic for the immediate future, but certainly it may, with time and care, come to fill a national need that neither Hollywood nor network TV has the freedom or the financial incentive to fill.

WALTER GOODMAN

Notes on the Critics

JOHN G. PEARSON is a British author and lecturer. PAUL ENGLE, who teaches at the University of Iowa, has published several volumes of poems and stories. WALTER GOODMAN is a free-lance writer on the popular arts.

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Architecture and Standard Forms

SIRS:

A bouquet to you for "controversial" matter. I do not know Robert Woods Kennedy. He tells an important feature of the truth (in "Architecture and the New Package Style," *NR*, April 14)—the use of foolish, inappropriate shapes for Democratic buildings—but I am somewhat abashed to see the breeches of my grandfatherhood hung out on the line with the knee-breeches of my offspring. You might call Kennedy's attention to the Middle West?

FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT
Phoenix, Arizona

. . .

SIRS:

Mr. Kennedy's article is a provocative statement which, like his book, will attract wide interest among both architects and the many laymen who aspire to be architectural critics. . . .

Unfortunately, while Mr. Kennedy acknowledges that ideals have a part in architecture, he fails to mention what they are. The laudatory use of "humane" is as ambiguous as the pejorative use of "mechanistic." . . . He praises the Greeks' enduring simple "standard" form, and the New Englanders' simple salt box, both of which he submits as examples of architecture which was "endlessly refined" and therefore, presumably started from a kind of unrefined "Euclidean Blocks." But he refuses to see any virtue in modern architecture's use of simple standard forms which represent an attempt to keep to the course of our own architectural development and bright destiny.

MILTON D. LOWENSTEIN
Senior Instructor, Architecture
State University of New York
Delhi, New York

. . .

SIRS:

There is all too little critical writing on architecture. Music and the arts have long been used to critical analysis but, except for Lewis Mumford's articles in *The New Yorker*, there has only been a great void in architecture This is a brilliant piece by Robert Woods Kennedy. It says so many things that I've not had the ability to say that I find myself nodding in agreement or chuckling with appreciation. I hope this starts a new era of criticism and that we hear often from Mr. Kennedy.

WILLIAM W. WURSTER, *Dean*
College of Architecture
University of California
Berkeley, California

► Cat on a Hot Tin Roof

SIRS:

I wonder if, in his analysis of *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof* (*NR*, April 11), Mr. Bentley has not been a little hasty in his interpretation of the meaning of the play. He begins his piece with the announcement that: "The cat of the title is the heroine, the roof her husband; he would like her to jump off, that is, find a lover." (!) His ensuing analysis deals mostly with the plane of the play concerning sexual problems, and the whole metaphor, as read by Bentley, begins to look a bit preposterous.

I believe that the source of Williams' title is a section towards the end of Strindberg's *Advent:*

> Judge: . . . Love! What was it?
> His wife: What was it? Two cats on an outhouse roof!

To convey the abjection and horror of this moment in Strindberg's play is difficult in a short space: briefly, a judge, who has led a life of righteous self-deception always judging others, not himself, lying, cheating his neighbors, corrupting his wife — this "gentleman" and his wife suddenly are faced with the spectre of death. The play presents episodically the terror struck into them by their layer-by-layer unearthing of the falsity and mendacity of their past until finally they find themselves looking into a vulgar peep-show box where they see their lives grotesquely epitomized: ". . . Everything is there. . . . It is as though all the memories, even the tenderest, had become rotten. . . . But, I [the judge] still have the words . . . love, wine, song, flowers, children, joy. Don't they sound pretty! And that is all we have left." In this context then, what are the two cats on the outhouse roof? They are many things in the abstruse symbolism of this play—but all these things add up to this: that they are the expression of moral horror on the part of the two people who have destroyed by deceit everything in them but the indestructible moral horror that they cannot escape from.

You might say that Strindberg was dramatizing the inescapability of Judgment in secular, rather than religious terms. Thus, there is the presumption of nobility of man emphasized by his *suffering* at his depravity, rather than a purely amoral ("dirty") picture of man, the animal.

It has often been observed that Williams "follows" Strindberg. Too few people realize the extent that this is so. Most often cited is *Miss Julie* with reference to *Streetcar Named Desire*. An even more striking one is *The Keys to the Kingdom of Heaven* with reference to *Camino Real*. Admirers of Williams who read his short introduction to *Camino Real* in the *New York Times* Drama Section, but who did not fully understand his meaning in the play, would do well to make the comparison —the significant key being that they are both a dramatic form of *biography*, undertaken, as Williams said, to clear the air.

From what I have said above about Strindberg's *Advent*, it should be clear that here again is a relationship between a specific play of Strindberg's and one of Williams'. On the surface, the plays present depravity, especially mendacity, centering around an aging "gentleman." At another level, they both deal with

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the painful catharsis (outwardly a self-destruction, inwardly a purification) . . . that is brought on by the advent of death. . . .

The question arises what exactly is the relationship between Williams and Strindberg. I believe the most we can say is that it is one of *inspiration,* inspiration that has brought maturity to Williams as an artist, that has given him a freedom at the price of limitation, as is so often the case in art. . . . To return to Mr. Bentley's commentary, usually highly stimulating, I wonder if he hasn't pushed the Kazan thing too far this time by so sharply contrasting the purity of Kazan's direction with the "dirtyness" of Williams' script.

W. BARKLIE HENRY

Washington, D. C.

► Lawrence of Arabia

SIRS:

I read the review by Robert Graves of Aldington's book, *Lawrence of Arabia,* and also the extract from *The Mint,* (*NR,* March 21), which struck me as a piece of atrocious overwriting, which you would reject from any American. I now have the Aldington book from London, and I am puzzled to understand why, if you wanted a balanced review of the book, you invited Robert Graves, of all people, to supply it. Graves, of course, is red with anger at having his own words confronting him. It would be impossible for him to see the book in perspective.

It was inevitable that the Lawrence legend should eventually be analyzed. It is impossible for the young American of today to imagine the feeling about Lawrence in England at the time of his death. I was in England then and I remember very well the indignation I incurred when I said the man must have been out of his mind, to ride a motor cycle at high speed along the narrow English country roads frequented by children. My host got so mad that he told me "the fact is, the man was so great you could never understand his greatness."

I had been in the Royal Navy in the Red Sea when Lawrence was executing his exploits, blowing up trains. The feeling was, the blowing-up was doing very little to get the Turks away. They returned every night after our planes had chased them from the water holes. I was at Laheijan, or Weij, as Aldington spells it. Possibly we were prejudiced, as the Navy received almost no credit for their operations. Whereas Lawrence became a tutelary deity for the stay-at-home British. The reputation, of course, was due to Lowell Thomas' book, but who can blame Thomas? He naturally believed that Lawrence was telling him the truth.

I was criticized on one occasion in England for rating Lawrence's statement, that he read 50,000 books, five or six a day, as arrant schoolboy rubbish. A censor in Port Said, who read Greek and Arabic as well as French and Italian, told me Lawrence's knowledge of Arabic was not remarkable.

Aldington's book will not scotch the legend. The British prefer a legend to a fact any day. But I expect more sanity from Americans. Let them read the book. They will find Mr. Graves' review something less than definitive.

WILLIAM MCFEE

Roxbury, Connecticut

The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.

► Bundles for Stevenson

SIRS:

Three cheers for Edith Gifford's letter (*NR,* March 28), about saving money for Adlai Stevenson's 1956 campaign. I have been wanting to turn in my own progress report for months now; her mention of "other readers" is an open invitation in this regard.

Let me begin by stating a premise which I believe to be fact: the Democratic Party can elect Adlai Stevenson President of the United States in 1956 *regardless of who* the Republican candidate may be. This declaration assumes no greater inspiration than our candidate provided in 1952, though—admittedly—a greater degree of party unity. A distinguished Democratic Senator stated it more succinctly in a letter dated August 7th, 1953, when he wrote: "In my judgment he [Stevenson] is the Democratic Party's best hope for victory in 1956."

I think the millions who are waiting for an opportunity to vote for Stevenson in 1956 must remember that he must *first* win nomination. . . . When it appears—fifteen months from now—that a Democrat *can* win in '56, a heated intra-party struggle will be underway for the nomination. That struggle, incidentally, is long since off and running. The evidence is in that at least three "candidates"—not including Stevenson—are working actively, at this writing, in the direction of nomination.

It is all important that the ground swell for Stevenson—which is very real—be made apparent between now and the summer of '56. Names and addresses of the committeemen and committeewomen may be had by sending a dollar (to help defray the cost of printing, postage and paper) to the Democratic National Committee, 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. More than six months ago I began the perhaps-monumental task of approaching each of these party leaders through the medium of a personal letter. I have sincerely tried to make my correspondence simple, direct, and forceful. Needless to say, I am now in midstream. But the incoming mail has been encouraging.

Others, it seems to me, might attempt a less ambitious route: postal cards, for example. But—to those who will make the supreme selection in Chicago—we need to say, and with conviction, *We intend to work for the election of Adlai Stevenson, in 1956!*

C. WILLIAM PLATT

Wichita, Kansas

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

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